We describe a system, PEP3, for storage and retrieval of IP flow information in which the IP addresses are replaced by pseudonyms. Every eligible party gets its own set of pseudonyms. A single entity, the transcryptor, that is composed of five independent peers, is responsible for the generation of, depseudonymisation of, and translation between different sets of pseudonyms. These operations can be performed by any three of the five peers, preventing a single point of trust or failure. Using homomorphic aspects of ElGamal encryption the peers perform their operations on encrypted -and potentially-pseudonymised IP addresses only, thereby never learning the (pseudonymised) IP addresses handled by the parties. Moreover, using Schnorr type proofs, the behaviour of the peers can be verified, without revealing the (pseudonymised) IP addresses either. Hence the peers are central, but need not be fully trusted. The design of our system, while easily modified to other settings, is tuned to the sheer volume of data presented by IP flow information.
Most routers of large network operators can perform this flow aggregation, and export the flow statistics (often using either NetFlow [9] , a Cisco protocol, or IPFIX [8] , an IETF standard) towards a storage facility (also called a collector in the literature). The storage facility usually discards the flow information after a set time span, e.g.,two weeks.
Even without the actual payload, flow measurements contain sufficient information for a plethora of use cases, such as keeping traffic statistics for network operators, large-scale measurement studies for researchers, or forensic activities by security teams. On the flip side flow information may reveal very sensitive information, despite not containing the actual contents of the communication. Consider for example the IP address of a server hosting only one website, about a rare disease. Or consider a server that hosts many different videos; the duration and size of the flow generated by a viewing of a video might betray which video was watched. On top of this an IP address can constitute personal data under the GDPR.
Appreciating that flow information is both of great use and a potential risk, we propose to reduce this risk without sacrificing too much usability by replacing the IP address in the flow data by pseudonyms, and, moreover, to use a unique set of pseudonyms for every eligible party (storage facility, researcher, investigator, etc., further explained in Section 2.2). This might be achieved by (deterministically and symmetrically) encrypting IP addresses destined for a certain party by a secret key unique to-but not shared with-that party. We hold that the transcryptor, the entity that keeps these secret keys, and is thus responsible for generating and translating the pseudonyms, 1. should not learn the IP addresses it processes for the parties; 2. should not have a single point of failure; and 3. should be verifiable.
In this paper we describe PEP3, a system that fulfils these requirements by: 3 1. having the transcryptor deal with encrypted pseudonyms only, and leveraging homomorphic aspects of ElGamal [10] encryption, noted earlier in [22] (and arguably [4, 7] ), to perform the required operations on these encrypted pseudonyms; 2. breaking the central secret keys held by the transcryptor into ten shards each, and dividing those shards over five independent peers-which together form the transcryptor-in such a way that every triple of peers, but no pair, together has all ten shards; and 3. verifying the honesty of the peers by (occasionally retroactively) requiring a Schnorr type proof (see Section 3.2) for the performed operation.
We envision that a network operator wishing to run PEP3 would hire five independent and geographically diverse hosting providers to run the peers, and would arrange by contract that the shards are not disclosed, even to the network operator itself.
In the design of any complex system there are a lot of knobs to turn, and dials to watch. We do not pretend that our system is optimal, nor that we have defined what optimal should mean in this context. We have, however, preferred simplicity and speed over cleverness and additional features. Where possible, we have chosen tried and trusted cryptographic systems (curve25519, ElGamal encryption, Schnorr type proofs) over exciting new techniques (such as pairing based cryptography). We have also carefully avoided the need for peers to store any additional information after a setup phase, reducing the need for locking, and dangers of filling volumes.
Contributions PEP3 builds on the PEP system[22] designed to store medical research data. Our system differs in several ways from PEP (see Section 4.3), most notably in that we divide the three different roles (transcryptor, access manager, key server) in PEP over five peers. The trick of splitting a global secret into shards, and dividing it over several peers, so that only a subset of them is needed to perform the action, is certainly a classic idea, 4 but it has to our knowledge never been combined with homomorphic encryption and Schnorr type proofs in this way before. The privacy, security, and verifiability offered by this combination may certainly find application to other situations as well.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic functioning of the transcryptor as a single entity, and then built it from five peers in Section 3. In Section 4 we address final points by discussing technical problems, and describe how this work fits in with the GDPR and related academic works. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
Transcryptor

Polymorphic Encryption and Pseudonymisation
The group We base PEP3 on curve25519, an elliptic curve introduced by Daniel Bernstein in [2] , and named after the prime p := 2 255 −19, because it is both fast, and has stood up to the scrutiny caused by its popularity. Using Mike Hamburg's decaf-technique [15] curve25519 gives rise to the ristretto255[21,20] group G, a special way to represent the cyclic group Z/ℓZ of integers modulo the prime ℓ := 2 252 + 27, 742, 317, 777, 372, 353, 535, 851, 937, 790, 883, 648, 493.
Although Z/ℓZ and G are isomorphic as groups, the number 1 of Z/ℓZ being send to a specific non-zero base point B, there is no known efficient algorithm to find given an element A from G the unique number n of Z/ℓZ with nB = A. In other words, the discrete log problem is difficult in G. We also assume it to be hard to solve the more difficult decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (see [5] ) in G, that is, to determine whether a triplet (A, M, N ) of elements of G is a so-called Diffie-Hellman triplet, that is, whether writing (A, M, N ) ≡ (aB, mB, nB) we have am = n. We will see that such hardness assumptions can be used to show that cryptosystems based on G are resistant to several simple attacks. The actual security provided by these cryptosystems is, however, much more difficult to capture formally, see Section 3 "Security" of [2] , introducing curve25519 for a detailed discussion.
IP addresses For now we will represent an IP address by a non-zero element A of the group G. We will show in Section 4.1 how to encode 128 bit IP addresses (thus supporting both IPv6 and IPv4) as elements of G.
ElGamal Encryption For the encryption of IP addresses we use the following scheme based on [10] . For any scalar r ∈ Z/ℓZ the triple ( rB, M + rsB, sB ) represents the encryption of a message M ∈ G for the private key s ∈ Z/ℓZ. The public key associated with s is the element sB of G. In general, a cyphertext is a triple (β, γ, τ ) of elements of G, where β is the blinding, γ is the core, and τ is the target. To encrypt a message M ∈ G for a public key τ ∈ G, one picks a random scalar r ∈ Z/ℓZ, and computes Note also that a triple (β, γ, τ ) is the cyphertext of some message M if and only if (β, τ, γ − M ) is a Diffie-Hellman triple. Decrypting a cyphertext without the secret key (or any other additional information) is thus just as difficult, if not harder than, the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.
Pseudonyms A pseudonym for an IP address represented by a non-zero group element A ∈ G is simply nA, where n ∈ Z/ℓZ is a scalar called the pseudonym key. Note that depending on the pseudonym key, the pseudonym for A could be any element of G.
In PEP3, the transcryptor keeps track of an encryption key s P and a pseudonym key n P , both non-zero scalars from Z/ℓZ, for every party P . The encryption key s P is shared with P , while the transcryptor keeps n P to herself. The pseudonym for P of an IP address A ∈ G is then n P A, and an encrypted pseudonym for P of A is a triple of the form (rB, n P A + rs P B, s P B) ≡ E (n P A, s P B, r) for some scalar r ∈ Z/ℓZ.
Translation The transcryptor has the following three elementary operations on cyphertexts at her disposal, where s, n, r ∈ Z/ℓZ, cf. [22] .
To translate an encrypted pseudonym for party P to an encrypted pseudonym for party Q, the transcryptor applies
changes the target of pseudonyms, sending E (n P M, τ, r) to E (n Q M, τ, n Q n −1 P r). The purpose of R r ′ is more technical, and threefold. To begin, it prevents spoofing of the target in the cyphertext: if the triple (rB, M + rsB, s ′ B), which pretends to be a cyphertext intended for s ′ B, but is surreptitiously decryptable by sB, is rerandomised, the result ( (r + r ′ )B, M + rsB + r ′ s ′ B, s ′ B ) does not reveal M to someone not knowing s ′ . It also prevents a party P from obtaining the unencrypted pseudonym for Q of an IP address A by sending (0, n P A, s P B) to the transcryptor for translation from P to Q. Finally, it makes the translation operation non-deterministic, reducing the risk of linkability.
(De)pseudonymisation To translate a for party P encrypted IP address to a for party Q encrypted pseudonym, the transcryptor applies K sQs −1 P S nQ R r ′ , where r ′ is some random scalar. Depseudonymisation is performed similarly.
Polymorphism and homomorphism The (ElGamal) encryption scheme we use is 'polymorphic' in the sense that a message encrypted for one party can be rekeyed to be decryptable by another party (without the need for intermediate decryption). Pseudonymisation is polymorphic in a similar sense.
The fact that the translation between pseudonyms can be performed on cyphertext makes the encryption 'homomorphic' with respect to this translation operation. At this point the transcryptor, knowing the secret keys of the parties, can sidestep the polymorphism and homomorphism by first decrypting, then translating, and finally encrypting again. However, when the transcryptor is split into five peers in the next section, this trick is no longer possible, and the advantage of the polymorphic and homomorphic aspects of the encryption become clear.
Parties
Before we explain the way the transcryptor is built (from five peers), we will sketch how we intend her services be used by the different parties.
Metering and storage The two most basic parties to PEP3 are the metering process (MP) generating flow records, and the storage facility (SF) storing the flow records. Recall that both parties get their own encryption keys s MP and s SF from the transcryptor, respectively. After the metering process has produced a batch of flow records aggregated from packets going over the network, it encrypts the associated IP addresses in these flow records using its own encryption key, s MP , and sends them to the transcryptor for translation to encrypted pseudonyms for s SF , which the transcryptor returns to the metering process. The metering process replaces the IP addresses in the flow records by these encrypted pseudonyms, and sends them along to the storage facility. Note that the metering process does not learn the pseudonyms for the storage facility, since they are returned by the transcryptor to the metering process encrypted for the storage facility's key, s SF . The storage facility, having received and decrypted the encrypted pseudonyms in the flow records, stores the pseudonymised flow records in its database.
Retrieval A party wishing to consult the records held by the storage facility may form a query in terms of their own set of pseudonyms, and then replace their pseudonyms by corresponding encrypted pseudonyms for the storage facility obtained from the transcryptor. Having received and performed the query, the storage facility returns the result, but only after having encrypted the pseudonyms (from the storage facility's set) with its encryption key, s SF . Having received the flow record with encrypted IP addresses, the querying party consults the transcryptor again, this time to translate the encrypted pseudonyms from the storage facility's set to its own set.
Queries Clearly not every type of query should be allowed by the storage facility lest it runs the risk of revealing (information about) its pseudonyms. This could not only happen directly via a comparison between a pseudonym and a plain string, but also by allowing, for example, an order by on a pseudonymised column. We think a practical solution would be to select a very minimal subset of SQL such that given the information about which columns and parameters are pseudonyms (and which are just plain values) the storage facility can easily annotate each expression in the query with either "pseudonym" or "plain value". Instead of listing which operations on pseudonyms are inadmissible, the storage facility should instead keep a list of which operations and expressions involving pseudonyms are admissible. For example: comparing a pseudonym with another pseudonym using == is admissible, and applying count to a pseudonym is admissible, and selecting a pseudonym is admissible, and nothing more.
Authorisation To prevent free translation between pseudonyms and IP addresses (defeating the pseudonymisation) a specific permit (signed by some predetermined certification authority) could be required by the transcryptor for a party wishing to perform a translation or (de)pseudonymisation. For example, the metering process only could be given a personal permit to pseudonymise into storage facility pseudonyms. A party wishing to retrieve records from the storage facility, such as a researcher, would need a permit to translate pseudonyms from its own set to the set of the storage facility (and back). Note that if such a researcher was to collude with the metering process, they could link IP addresses with their own pseudonyms.
Depseudonymisation warrant A party should never be given a blanket permit for depseudonymisation. Instead we envision that, say, an investigator would obtain a permit to depseudonymise a specific (encrypted) pseudonym from the relevant authority, after having presenting sufficient proof to warrant this.
Five Peers
Ten Shards
In PEP3, the transcryptor is split into five peers, named A, B, C, D, and E. As a general rule, three out of five peers should be able to act as transcryptor. To this end, each pseudonym key n P for a party P , is defined to be a product
shards, one for each triple of peers. Of course, the shard n ABE P is shared only among the peers A, B, and E, and so on. Note that no two peers (such as D and E) have access to all shards (D and E do not have the shards of ABC.) However, every triple does have access to all shards, because any two triples drawn from five peers must have at least one peer in common. The encryption key s P for a party P is split similarly into ten shards. For brevity's sake, let T := { ABE, ABC, BCD, CDE, ADE, ACD, BDE, ACE, ABD, BCE } denote the set of all ten triples of peers.
Translation An encrypted pseudonym for a party P can be translated to an encrypted pseudonym for party Q by applying the operations
where r T is a random scalar, and T ranges over T , in sequence. The order in which these operations are performed does affect the (random component of the) cyphertext, but not the resulting pseudonym (if the input was valid). Naturally, any of the three peers in the triple T can perform the operation in (1) . A translation can also be performed by three operations instead of ten, as follows. Choose three peers, say A, C, and D, and split the triples among them, by, say, and have A, C, and D perform the operations
all three X ∈ {A, C, D}, in sequence, on the encrypted pseudonym for P .
(De)pseudonymisation can be performed by three peers in a similar fashion.
Alternative constellations Our choice to divide the secrets of the transcryptor over the triples drawn from five peers is to some extend arbitrary. We could instead have chosen a system where the secrets are, for example, shared among pairs drawn from three peers (which is not resistant against collusion of two peers.) Another option is to break the symmetry between peers by giving a particularly important peer its own shard, forcing its involvement in any operation of the transcryptor.
Verification
Note that if one peer is offline, the transcryptor still functions. Nevertheless, a single peer can presently disrupt the system in another way, by producing erroneous results, possibly without being detected. One might argue that it is possible to prevent this by having multiple peers perform the same operation, and compare the results. This comparison is, however, complicated by the random component in the encryption. We propose a different method of verifying the peers' operations, namely by having the peers attach non-interactive [14] Schnorr type[17] proofs of correctness to their results. To keeps things simple we create these proof from the following basic building block.
Certified Diffie-Hellman triplets Recall that it is considered infeasible in general to determine whether a triplet (A, M, N ) of group elements of G is a Diffie-Hellman triplet, that is, whether writing (A, M, N ) ≡ (aB, mB, nB) we have am = n. If the scalar a is known, however, the matter is easily settled by checking whether aM = N . We will describe a method by which a prover knowing a can prove to a verifier that (A, M, N ) is a Diffie-Hellman triplet, without revealing a, using two group elements R M , R B , and one scalar s. We will say that (A, M, N ) is certified by (R M , R B , s). 
Taking h = 0, we see that Certifying K s S n R r Such certified Diffie-Hellman triplets can be used by a peer wishing to show to a party that a triple (β ′ , γ ′ , τ ′ ) is the result of performing the operation K s S n R r on a triple (β, γ, τ ), that is, that
Indeed, the peer would need only certify the five Diffie-Hellman triplets Random sampling Having peers attach proofs to all their operations comes at the cost of more than doubling the number of (computationally expensive) scalar multiplications required. This problem can be addressed by having the parties not always request a proof of the peers, but randomly with a probability, e.g., 1%. The request for a proof should be put to the peer as a follow-up question, after the operation's result has already been received by the party, lest the peer knows when to behave properly, and when it need not.
To produce such a proof after the fact, the peer either needs to remember the random scalars it used, or better, hand the random scalar to the peer (in a for the peer's eyes only encrypted package) to be returned to the peer upon a request for proof. It should, of course, be possible for a party to resubmit its request for a proof to a peer in case of an unexpected connection loss. It should also be prevented that the random scalar is used by the party in an unrelated request to the peer, by including a signature of the original operation in the encrypted package.
Note that a dishonest peer might be willing to risk detection by random sampling if its objective would be to disrupt only a single operation involving a specific IP address. However, the peer can not target a specific IP address, even if it knew its cyphertext, due to the rerandomisation. At best, the peer can try to target a specific IP address using side-channels such as the time, and size of the request, forcing it, perhaps, to cast a larger net, and increase its risk of detection.
Authorisation (for depseudonymisation) To check whether a party is authorised to have a certain operation performed, a peer can often simply demand a permit, and check it. There is, however, an interesting complication when the permit pertains to a specific encrypted pseudonym, say, to depseudonymise it. Surely, the first peer contacted by the party can check the permit. The second peer, however, being handed the partially depseudonymised encrypted pseudonym returned by the first peer, has no way of telling whether this partial result is related to the encrypted pseudonym mentioned in the permit. This problem is solved by requesting the first peer to attach a proof to its result, which the party can pass along to the second peer. Continuing in a similar fashion, we end up with a chain of partial results and attached proofs, that starts with the encrypted pseudonym mentioned in the warrant, and ends with the associated encrypted plain IP address.
Derivation of pseudonym and encryption keys
A triple T of peers derives the pseudonym key n T P and encryption key s T P for a party P from a master pseudonym key n T , and a master encryption key s T , respectively. We thereby circumvent the troubles of having to generate, store and synchronise keys s T P and n T P for every new party P , on demand. The keys are derived as follows: assuming that each party P has some unique identifier id P from some set I, and given a hash function H : I → Z/(ℓ − 1)Z, we set n T P := (n T ) H(idP ) and s T P := (s T ) H(idP ) . We derive the keys in this particular manner in order to make it possible for a peer to give proof that n T P B was derived from n T B, using the 253 group elements
. . .
Such a proof for n T P B is needed by peers and parties wishing to check a proof (from Section 3.2) in which n T P B appears. Any party Q should be able to request such a proof for n T P B from a peer in the triple T . In particular, the party P can pass along a proof of n T P B to a peer not in T needing proof of n T P B to verify, for example, a depseudonymisation request. In this way, the peer does not need to contact the other peers.
Regarding the security of this derivation scheme: we conjecture that recovering n T from the group elements (n T ) 2 0 B, . . . , (n T ) 2 252 B is essentially as difficult as computing the discrete log for one of 253 random group elements.
Setup and enrolment
We assume that the peers and parties can authenticate one another and communicate securely, e.g., by using TLS and certificates.
Setup To start PEP3 each triple T of peers needs to decide on secrets n T and s T , and the public parts n T B, (n T ) 2 B, . . . and s T B, (s T ) 2 B, . . . need to be shared with the other peers. The secret n ABC might be generated, for example, by first having each of the pairs AB, BC, AC use Diffie-Hellman key exchange to decide on secrets n AB , n BC , n AC , and then define n ABC := n AB n BC n AC . Of course, B and C would both need to transmit n BC to A, and A should check the missives agree, and so on. At this stage, any peer can anonymously disrupt the system by sending incorrect key material around. It would be preferable that dishonest action of a peer during setup would be identifiable by the other peers, and we see devising a scheme providing such safeguard as a possible improvement to our system. A perhaps simpler solution is to have each pair of peers compare the public parts they obtained, and abort when any inconsistencies are found.
Enrolment
The situation for adding a party P to the system, so-called enrolment, does not have the problem described in the setup phase. The party P simply requests the public keys n T B, (n T ) 2 B, . . . and s T B, (s T ) 2 B, . . . from every peer, and the secret s T P from every peer in the triple T , with proof for s T P B from s T B, (s T ) 2 B, . . . . If two peers in a triple send incorrect values for s T P , then if the other three peers are honest, P can detect the correct value for s T P , and thus which peers were dishonest, by following the majority's claim for the value of s T B, (s T ) 2 B, . . . .
Final points
Encoding IP addresses
One technical problem we encountered when using the ristretto255 group G was the lack of a direct way to encode a 128 bit piece of data w (such as an IPv6 or IPv4 address) as an element w of G in such a way that the data w can cheaply be recovered from w. Such an encoding is useful for encrypting w using the ElGamal scheme described in Section 2.1.
The other direction presents no problem: there is a canonical and reversible way to encode an element of G as a 32-byte string, but only ℓ/2 256 ≈ 6.25% of all 32-bytes strings are a valid encoding of an element from G. So what is usually done (circumventing the need to encode a message as group element before encrypting it) is to pick a random group element and use its 32-byte encoding to encrypt the message symmetrically.
This solution is not viable for our system, because rerandomisation and reshuffling cannot be applied to the symmetric cyphertext. Instead we would like to use elligator 2 [3] , which does give a reversible map ell2 : Z/pZ −→ G, but each element of G can have up to 16 preimages under ell2.
Since ell2(x) = ell2(−x) we can discard half the preimages by considering only the elements of Z/pZ whose minimal positive representative is even.
Thus the map ell2 ′ : {0, 1} 253 → G defined by
is reversible, and the preimage ell2 ′ −1 (A) of an element A ∈ G has at most 8 elements. Now, define lizard: {0, 1} 128 → G by
where h 1 · · · h 125 are the first 125 bits of the SHA-256 hash of b 1 · · · b 128 . Then lizard is easily computable, and reversible, and, the preimage lizard(A) of an element A ∈ G almost always contains at most 1 element. Indeed, assuming that the bits of a word w in the preimage ell2 ′ (A) are distributed randomly, the chance that the last 125 bits of such a word match the first 125 bits of the SHA-256 of w should be 1 2 125 . Thus the chance that given w ∈ {0, 1} 128 the preimage lizard −1 (lizard(w)) contains only w is at least (1 − 1 2 125 ) 7 . So even if 10 10 computers would apply lizard to 10 10 unique IP addresses per second for 300 years (≈ 10 10 seconds), all ≈ 2 100 IP addresses will map to a group element with a unique preimage with probability of at least (1 − 1 2 125 ) 7·2 100 ≥ 1 − 7 · 2 100 · 1 2 125 ≥ 1 − 1 2 21 ≥ 999,999 1,000,000 .
GDPR and pseudonymisation
Some remarks regarding the effects of the GDPR on our proposal are in order.
IP addresses as personal data
According to the GDPR[13], personal data is any information that can identify a natural person, either directly or indirectly, see article 4(1) (of the GDPR). This means that not only the full name of a natural person, but also just an IP address he or she used may constitute personal data. In fact, IP addresses are explicitly mentioned as potential identifiers in recital 30 (of the GDPR). Moreover, the European Court of Justice has decided that a dynamic IP address used by a natural person to visit a website constitutes personal data for the website operator provided the ISP has additional data needed to identify the user by the dynamic IP address, and the provider of the website has the legal means to obtain this additional data [11] . It is thus advisable for a network operator to treat any IP address as potential personal data.
Consent Perhaps contrary to popular belief processing of personal data does not necessarily require consent of the data subject. Consent is just one of six potential grounds for lawful processing provided in article 6.1. One of the other grounds is that the processing is necessary for a legitimate interest of the data controller. In fact, recital 49 mentions explicitly (but with qualifications) that processing of personal data for the purposes of network and information security constitutes a legitimate interest. It is not clear, however, whether this ground would cover processing of flow data for research, but it is not ruled out (in the context of clinical trails) in point 14 of an opinion, [12] , of the European Data Protection Board. Moreover, the Dutch research network operator SURFnet considers requests from researchers for using some of its flow records for research, albeit on a case-by-case basis, and under strict conditions, see [1] .
Pseudonymisation Pseudonymised personal data is still personal data, according to recital 26. Pseudonymisation is thus not a tool to circumvent the processing of personal data, and the associated legal restrictions. Instead, pseudonymisation is a technique that according to article 25.1 must be considered by any data controller to meet its obligation to implement data-protection principles such as data minimisation, article 5.1(c). It is not unthinkable that if flow data can be stored and used in pseudonymised form, it therefore must be, under the GDPR.
Related work
PEP As already mentioned, PEP3 is based on PEP, see https://pep.cs.ru.nl and [22] , which applies similar techniques to store personal medical data encrypted and pseudonymised. One of the main selling points of PEP is that the data subjects can control which parties get access to their medical data. PEP3, on the other hand, is more oriented towards helping network operators fulfil their data protection obligations. One important feature of PEP-not needed and thus not included in PEP3is the ability to store (medical) data (such as MRI scans) in polymorphically encrypted form. Indeed, if we were to store, say, the source and destination ports in encrypted form within the database of the storage facility, 5 we could no longer use them in queries, hampering the usability of the flow records.
While PEP and PEP3 are closely related, conceptually PEP is more intricate. The core functions of PEP are performed by three entities: the transcryptor, the access manager, and the key server. In PEP an encryption key s P for a party P is of the form s P ≡ k AM P k T P x, where k AM P and k T P are secrets that depend on P , and are known only by the access manager, and transcryptor, respectively, while x is a secret known only to the key server and does not depend on P .
To enrol in PEP, a party P contacts the key server and access manager, but not the transcryptor; the transcryptor is contacted by the access manager on the party's behalf. The key server does not send x to P directly, because it is important that x is kept a secret. For the same reason the access manager can not relay k AM P k T P to the party P for enrolment, because with k AM P k T P and s P the party P could compute x. Therefore the clever scheme depicted in Figure 2 .3 of [22] is needed to enrol a party. From the PEP3 viewpoint one can think of x as the encryption key of a "generic party" G, so x = s G and k AM G = k T G = 1. The reason that it is important that x ≡ s G is kept a secret is that when party makes a request to PEP involving a data subject identifier, this identifier is encrypted not for the party's encryption key s P , but instead for G's encryption key s G ≡ x. The resulting cyphertext is called a polymorphic pseudonym, an important concept in PEP, avoided in PEP3.
In PEP, the access manager acts as the gatekeeper: all queries intended for the storage facility are put directly to the access manager. This makes a more fine-grained access control possible in PEP than in PEP3, where the peers do not learn which queries they facilitate. This is the general trend: PEP3 sacrifices features of PEP for the sake of simplicity.
The main improvement of PEP3 over PEP is the sharding of secrets, and the addition of Schnorr type proofs, preventing PEP3 from malfunctioning (after setup) even if two of the five peers misbehave.
Other related work The rekeying of ElGamal cyphertext has appeared before under the name atomic proxy re-encryption, in [4] .
Camenisch and Lehmann [7, 6] propose a pseudonym system that appears rather similar to ours from a high-level viewpoint, involving a converter (≈transcryptor), server ( ≈party) specific pseudonyms, and exploiting homomorphic aspects of ElGamal as well. Their system is, however, much more advanced, employing, for example, pairing based cryptography, and being verified by formal security models. Their focus is currently[6] on making the system user-auditable, having as use case governmental databases in mind; our focus is on making a robust and fast transcryptor. Under the hood their converter functions quite differently from our transcryptor: the converter consists of a single entity (instead of five peers), generates pseudonyms randomly (instead of deterministically deriving them from secrets, as PEP3 does,) and needs to keep records on all the pseudonyms it previously generated. The last point might be problematic when trying to apply their system to our use case of storing internet flow data, due to the large number of IP addresses.
Conclusion
We have described PEP3, a system for pseudonymising IP flow data built on curve25519 via the ristretto255 group G. An important feature of PEP3 is a robust transcryptor (consisting of five peers) that functions even when two peers act dishonestly. Moreover, the peers do not learn the pseudonyms they process, and the the peers' actions can be verified. We also showed how to map IP addresses to G by a for-all-practical-purposes reversible method (using elligator2). Concerning future research, PEP3 would benefit greatly from an improved way to generate its secrets that cannot be disrupted by an anonymous peer. Moreover, it would be interesting to see if the flow-based intrusion detection system SSHCure [16] could run against PEP3.
On the more practical side, the next order of business for us is to load test our internal prototype of PEP3 by connecting it to a router generating flow data. We expect this experiment leads to several adjustments to PEP3.
